

マクロ経済理論からみたわが国の産業構造の変化*

The Genkyoku System on the Formation of Industrial Policy in Japan

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1. Introduction

This paper provides one of the secret system on the industrial policy formation in Japan. There are almost no empirical studies in this field. Until recently the term “Industrial Policy” was seldom used for Japanese policy development in English. In the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan, there is now an Industrial Policy Bureau. However even in MITI, the term was not widely used until around 1970. Until 1970, the term of “Administrative Guidance for Industries” was used instead of “Industrial Policy”.

In the past, the industrial policy was defined as “government policies taken in order to change allocation of resources among industries or the level of some economic activity of the constituent firms of an industry”. In other words, industrial policy aims at increasing production, investment, research and development, modernization or restructuring in some industry or industries, and decreasing them in other industries. Protective tariffs and excise taxes on luxuries are “classical” examples of policies under this definition. From the view point of economic theory, several points can be made concerning what is labelled in government circles as industrial policy. First, the “industry” of industrial policy is in most cases assumed to be manufacturing and hence does not include agriculture, construction services, or transportation. Electric power and other energy-related sectors are within MITI’s authority, and they are commonly included as objects of industrial policy.

2. Market and Industrial Policy

Industrial policy should be developed fundamentally in the case of “market failures”, that is, failures of market mechanism or price mechanism through allocating resources efficiently. Industrial Policy is aimed at preventing possible market failures or to compensate for them as they occur. From this point we can group industrial policy’s function into several categories :

- a) a policy directed the construction of the social infrastructure of industries, such as the provision of industrial sites, road and ports, water and electric power supplies.
- b) a policy facilitating the resource allocation system between industries.
- c) a policy aimed at the regulation of the internal organization of particular industries, such as industrial reconstructing, supporting to withdraw from the declining industry, output restrictions and the adjustment of output and investment.

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The type of industrial policy include :

- 1) a policy to nurture a strategic industry for short-run stimulation a National Economy.
- 2) a policy to cultivate a research and development intensive industry (high-technology industry) for a long-run growth of a National Economy.
- 3) a policy to support firms withdrawing from a declining industry.
- 4) a policy to avoid a trade friction – for example – an administrative guidance for voluntary export regulation.
- 5) a policy to support cross-industry organization, such as small and medium size enterprise measures.

Summing up, in contrast to fiscal and monetary policy work, industrial policy works in the long-run on a National Economy. Then, through what process are industrial policy decided in Japan ?

3. Industrial Policy Formation

(1) The “Genkyoku” System

Until the mid of 1980's, the Japanese Diet played almost no rule in setting industrial policy. Almost all laws were drafted by the bureaucracy, and those that the government sought to have passed in general went through successfully, without amendment. These groups whose influence is substantial in the formulation of industrial policy on the government side are the “genkyoku” bureaus – divisions and sections within the various ministries ; and the mediating bureaus, – also divisions and sections that adjust between different parts of ministry and different ministries.

The “genkyoku” bureau control each industry in order that the industry for which they are responsible remain organised, without such strong competition that some firms go bankrupt. Government officials have no desire to see excess competition, in any form, in their jurisdiction. They would prefer for a stable order to be maintained in which all firms make a reasonable profit, and to assure that none of their firms get into trouble, and that their industry is not faced with the spectre of import competition or the entry of foreign firms.

(2) The Mediating Bureaus

Until 1982 in MITI, with the exception of the Ministerial Secretariat, five of nine bureaus were “genkyoku” bureaus :

- the Heavy Industries Bureau
- the Chemical Industries Bureau
- the Textile and Light Industries Bureau
- the Coal and Mining Industries Bureau

the Public Utilities Bureau

Each bureau is subdivided internally into divisions and then into sections. For example, within the Heavy Industries Bureau, sections for iron and steel, industrial machinery, electronics and electrical machinery, automobiles, aircraft and rolling stocks could be found. This is called the vertical system because each specialises in an industry or industries.

However, within MITI there is also a horizontal system in which four bureaus specialise in problem oriented method and regulation of inter-industries problems. Until 1982, these were :

the Enterprise Bureau

the Trade Promotion Bureau

The International Trade Bureau

the Safety and Environmental Protection Bureau

It should be noted that such mediating bureaus are also very important in formulating industrial policy, because they settled conflicts between the “genkyoku” bureaus. Until 1982, the Head of the Heavy Industries Bureau and of the Enterprise Bureau became a vice-minister by turns.

After 1983, the gravity of the horizontal bureaus in MITI has increased relative to the “genkyoku” – vertical bureaus. The “genkyoku” bureaus are now :

the Basic Industries Bureau

the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau

the Consumer Goods Industries Bureau

the Agency of National Resource and Energy

The horizontal bureaus are now :

the Industrial Policy Bureau

the International Trade Policy Bureau

the International Trade Administration Bureau

the Industrial Location and Environmental Protection Bureau

The Ministerial Secretariat within MITI remains. From 1983, the Head of the Industrial Policy Bureau became a vice-minister. This fact means the horizontal bureaus have taken the initiative in proposing industrial policies increased greatly compared with the vertical bureaus.

(3) “Genkyoku” and the Mediating Bureaus

These changing from 1983 means that the “genkyoku” – vertical bureaus have less of role in formulating policies for their protective industries benefit. On the contrary, the horizontal bureaus roles become much more important in formulating industrial policies. It seems that in Japan’s industrial policy, the policy issues which cutting across many industries or across industrial policy or economic policy as a whole have become the major policy issues.

⟨References⟩

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